In recent years, China's population negative growth has become increasingly severe. Despite local governments significantly relaxing marriage registration restrictions, opening the two-child policy, and even directly transferring subsidies to encourage young families to have children, they have still been unable to reverse the birth rate avalanche.
Why are young Chinese people today unwilling to have offspring within just a few years?
Population Dividend in Crisis: Why Are Fertility Incentives Failing?
China's economic growth previously relied on massive labor force, but now the impact of low birth rates has spread to the labor market and social welfare system. Why do young generations generally lack confidence in the future and would rather "lie flat" than enter marriage and childbearing? A research published in Sage Journals directly states:
"High childcare costs and housing price pressures have discouraged many young families from even entering marriage."
With policies continuously introduced but unable to change the collective choice of "not giving birth", it shows that the problem cannot be solved by subsidies alone.
Economic Pressure: Housing Prices and Education Costs Squeeze
According to research, economic pressure is the main reason. Calculations show that for urban families, preschool education, after-school classes, and medical expenses for a child aged 0-6 already account for nearly 40% of disposable income, easily consuming young parents' cash savings. Moreover, these expenses will continue to rise as the child grows, until the next generation enters work and marriage, with costs becoming unimaginable.
Housing prices are even more realistic. Data compiled by Wikipedia's population entry shows that the housing price-to-income ratio in first-tier Chinese cities has long maintained a double-digit level, often requiring ten years to save for a down payment. The Think Global Health report also reminds that slowing income growth exacerbates anxiety about "income unable to catch up with price increases", with having children seen as an additional risk rather than a blessing.
Subsidy Comparison: China's Amount Scattered, Taiwan's System Comprehensive
To boost fertility rates, many Chinese provinces and cities have promoted one-time childcare subsidies, monthly childcare allowances, and extended maternity leave, using direct account transfers to reduce administrative friction. However, reports from Frontiers in Pharmacology and China Daily Hong Kong Edition in July both point out that subsidy amounts generally range between 3,000 to 10,000 yuan, which is merely a drop in the bucket compared to the millions in child-rearing costs.
Paternity leave days vary locally, from 7 to 30 days, making it difficult to systematize male caregiving responsibilities.
In contrast, Taiwan centrally manages through national health insurance and social welfare systems. Maternity leave is 56 days, paternity leave 5 days, both fully paid, with childcare subsidies starting from 5,000 New Taiwan Dollars per month for ages 0-6, along with public childcare and kindergarten fee subsidies. Despite better welfare, it still fails to persuade young couples.
Female Choice: Education Brings Different Life Paths
The third force comes from rapidly rising female self-awareness.
Number Analytics' July analysis shows that female higher education enrollment and labor participation rates are rising simultaneously, with career development and independent living becoming their core goals. A UCL study adds that while Chinese maternity leave can be extended to a year, short paternity leave means childcare responsibilities still mostly fall on mothers, deepening work-family conflicts. Many interviewed women frankly admit resistance to becoming "super mothers".
The Think Global Health report further indicates that when household and childcare division is unequal and career advancement is affected, women are more likely to postpone or even give up childbearing. This choice is no longer a minority case but a collective action of urban middle-class women, signaling the loosening of traditional family models.
In summary, China's fertility rate collapse is not a short-term fluctuation but a result of intertwined economic pressure, insufficient policies, and gender role changes. Experiences from both sides of the strait show that simply increasing subsidies cannot reverse the trend. The real key lies in reducing education and housing costs, strengthening public childcare, and establishing gender-friendly workplaces. Only when young people believe they can "afford to have, afford to raise, and have support", can the population curve have a chance to stabilize and rebound.
